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NOT FROM A WICKED HEART: TESTING 
THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PROVOCATION 
DOCTRINE 
Carlton J. Patrick* and Debra Lieberman** 
The normative logic of the provocation doctrine rests on the long-held, yet 
untested, assumption that anger can motivate people to act in ways which they 
believe are morally wrong. Here we provide a frontline inquiry into this premise 
in the context of the quintessential provocation scenario: a man witnessing or 
learning of his partner’s infidelity. Among men who had discovered a partner’s 
affair, anger was more strongly correlated with motivation to retaliate than with 
judgments as to whether such retaliation was morally acceptable. Moreover, an-
ger explained increases in motivation beyond what could be accounted for by in-
creases in moral judgments. However, these effects were not uniform to all be-
haviors: anger motivated retaliation beyond what participants thought was 
morally acceptable only for those acts salient to the function of anger in this con-
text (yelling, pushing, and striking). Taken together, these results partially sup-
port the traditional assumptions of the provocation doctrine while calling other 
aspects of the doctrine’s normative framework into question. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In most jurisdictions in the United States, homicides committed in the 
“heat of passion” are treated as manslaughter and are punished less severely 
than premeditated or intentional killings.1 In some jurisdictions, the punishment 
for assault or battery can be similarly mitigated.2 The heat of passion doc-
trine—sometimes referred to as the doctrine of provocation3—is premised on 
the assumption that one who kills while in a highly emotional state may not act 
from “any wickedness of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition,” but 
rather as “[a] result of the temporary excitement, by which the control of reason 
was disturbed.”4 
Importantly, this rationale assumes a certain feature of human psychology: 
that being in a highly emotional state can cause people to behave in ways that 
they otherwise feel are morally unacceptable.5 This phenomenon has, surpris-
ingly, received little attention from behavioral researchers. There has been 
much work focusing on the relationship between emotion states and behavior,6 
and separately on the influence of emotions on moral judgment,7 but there has 
been very little research that has attempted to triangulate the relationship be-
tween the three. As a result, the provocation doctrine—a doctrine that can be 
traced as far back as twelfth-century English decisions—remains reasoned on a 
                                                        
1  Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial Justification 
and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1031 n.1 (2011) (explaining that the 
provocation defense exists in one form or another in almost every state, and noting that in 
Illinois and Texas provocation results in a lower category of murder rather than murder). 
2  See, e.g., Christian v. State, 951 A.2d 832, 848 (Md. 2008) (holding “that the mitigation 
defenses of hot-blooded response to adequate provocation and imperfect self-defense could 
apply to [cases of] first degree assault . . .”); State v. Smith, 858 N.E.2d 1222, 1235 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2006) (discussing the mitigating circumstance of provocation for cases of aggravat-
ed assault). 
3  We use the terms interchangeably here. 
4  E.g., People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1128 (Cal. 2013) (citing Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 
212, 219 (Mich. 1862)). 
5  Infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
6  See generally Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 799 (2015) (reviewing psychological research on emotions and behavior). 
7  See generally Yana R. Avramova & Yoel Inbar, Emotion and Moral Judgment, 4 WILEY 
INTERDISC. REVIEWS: COGNITIVE SCI. 169 (2013) (reviewing psychological research on emo-
tions and moral judgment). 
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largely-untested psychological premise.8 This Article provides a frontline ex-
amination of this premise by testing whether anger—the emotion most associ-
ated with the provocation doctrine—can cause people to act in ways that they 
feel are otherwise morally unacceptable. 
I. THE PROVOCATION DOCTRINE 
A. Development and Variatio ns in Brief 
 While an exhaustive overview of the historical development and various it-
erations of the provocation doctrine is outside the scope of this article, a brief 
review should help place the assumptions being tested here in context.9 
The United States adopted the provocation doctrine from English common 
law, but variants of the rule can be found in other, much older, legal codes.10 
The Attic Code of Ancient Greece, for example, specified that the usual pun-
ishment of exile could be mitigated for certain killings including “kill[ing] an-
other unintentionally in an athletic contest, or overcoming him in a fight on the 
highway, or unwittingly in battle, or in intercourse with his wife, or mother, or 
sister, or daughter, or concubine kept for the procreation of legitimate chil-
dren.”11 The first recognizable formation of the provocation standard, which 
appears to have emerged in the seventeenth century in England, required the 
killing to have occurred while the killer was in the “ ‘heat of blood’ ” and that 
the heat of blood must have been brought about by provocation that was “suffi-
ciently grave.”12 And by the late nineteenth century, the United States Supreme 
Court had annunciated the rule that, to a large degree, resembles the framework 
in place today: 
                                                        
8  See JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 1–22 (1992) (discussing the his-
torical development of the provocation doctrine). 
9  Over the past thirty-five years, legal scholars have produced a spate of articles detailing the 
doctrinal evolution of provocation laws. By and large, these accounts have had few points of 
disagreement; recent articles tracing the historical development of the doctrine tend to coa-
lesce on the same general account, and moreover tend to cite many of the same primary 
sources for information. For some in-depth accounts see, e.g., id. at 1–42; Berman & Farrell, 
supra note 1, at 1035–44; Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search 
of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 425–32 (1982) [hereinafter Dressler, Re-
thinking Heat of Passion]. See generally SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING 
THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER (1998); A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provoca-
tion, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292 (1976). 
10  Theophile J. Meek (trans.), The Middle Assyrian Laws, in ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS 
RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 181 (James B. Pritchard ed., 3d ed., 1969). 
11  DAVID COHEN, LAW, SEXUALITY, AND SOCIETY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS IN 
CLASSICAL ATHENS 100 (1991) (“If a man kills another unintentionally in an athletic contest, 
or overcoming him in a fight on the highway, or unwittingly in battle, or in intercourse with 
his wife, or mother, or sister, or daughter, or concubine kept for procreation of legitimate 
children, he shall not go into exile as a manslayer on that account.”) (quoting Demosthenes’ 
oration Against Aristocrates). 
12  Berman & Farrell, supra note 1, at 1035–36 (outlining the crystallization of the contem-
porary standard in 17th century England) (citations omitted). 
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The law in recognition of the frailty of human nature, regards a homicide com-
mitted under the influence of sudden passion, or in hot blood, produced by ade-
quate cause, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool, as an 
offense of a less heinous character than murder.13 
Historically, the law defined specific, narrow categories as to what could 
count as adequate provocation.14 These traditional categories had their roots in 
the male code of honor, and were thought to be such an affront to one’s reputa-
tion as to compel a response.15 They are often referred to as the “nineteenth 
century four,” and include: (1) a “grossly insultive assault,” (2) “witnessing an 
attack upon a friend or relative,” (3) witnessing a false arrest, and (4) “witness-
ing one’s wife in the act of adultery.”16 Adultery, specifically, has always occu-
pied a privileged status at the heart of the doctrine.17 In fact, nearly all scholars 
agree that the paradigmatic case of provocation is that of a man who, upon dis-
covering his spouse in flagrante delicto, flies into a violent rage and kills his 
partner, her paramour, or both.18 
                                                        
13  Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 510 (1898). 
14  Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1688–89 (2005) (“At com-
mon law, for example, an alleged provocation was inadequate as a matter of law if it fell out-
side certain narrow categories of adequacy, and was adequate as a matter of law if it fell 
within them.”). 
15  See HORDER, supra note 8, at 25–29 (explaining the doctrine as a product of honor theo-
ry); Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation De-
fense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1340–41 (1997) (tracing the traditional categories to a definition 
of provocation “derived from an older social order, indeed, a code of honor”) (citations omit-
ted); see also Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who 
Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 79 (1992) (tracing the doctrine to the settle-
ment of “ ‘breaches of honor’ ”). 
16  See Berman & Farrell, supra note 1, at 1036 (outlining the “four distinct—and exhaus-
tive—categories of provocative conduct considered ‘sufficiently grave to warrant the reduc-
tion from murder to manslaughter of a hot-blooded intentional killing.’ ”); see also Coker, 
supra note 15, at 80 (citing M.D.G., Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: 
The Reasonableness of the Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1023–24 (1958), on 
“ ‘nineteenth century four’ ”). 
17  Compare People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1128 (Cal. 2013) (citing Manning’s Case, 83 
ENG. REP. 112 (1670)) (where the judge sentenced the defendant—who killed his wife after 
catching her in the throes of an affair—to a burning of the hand but directing the executioner 
to “burn him gently, because there could not be greater provocation than this”), with Tamar 
Lewin, What Penalty for a Killing in Passion?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/21/us/what-penalty-for-a-killing-in-= passion.html?mcubz 
=1 [https://perma.cc/EKX6-6H8S] (where the judge sentenced the defendant—who killed his 
wife after finding her in bed with another man—to 18 months in prison saying he wished he 
did not have to send him to prison at all, and wondering “how many men married five, four 
years would have the strength to walk away without inflicting some corporal punishment”). 
As a frame of reference, in the span of time between these pronouncements, the world wit-
nessed the discoveries of gravity, electricity, evolution, germ theory, x-rays, penicillin and 
DNA, not to mention Sigmund Freud, William James, the Cognitive Revolution, neurosci-
ence and nearly every modern theory of human behavior. See generally JOHN HENRY, A 
SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT (2012). 
18  See, e.g., Coker, supra note 15, at 72 (“English and American jurists and legal scholars 
repeatedly refer to adultery as the paradigm example of provocation adequate enough to mit-
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Over time, these strict nineteenth century categories have been replaced by 
broader standards that encapsulate a range of potential provoking events.19 The 
typical common law standard, for example, is structured such that any number 
of circumstances might constitute adequate provocation so long as the defend-
ant can show: (1) that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would 
have been adequately provoked, (2) that the defendant was in-fact provoked 
and became emotionally charged to an extent that he lost self-control, (3) that a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would not have had sufficient 
time to “cool off” between provocation and killing, and (4) that the defendant 
did not, in-fact, cool off before killing his victim.20 In jurisdictions that have 
adopted the heat of passion standards recommended by the Model Penal Code, 
the umbrella of killings covered by the defense has been broadened even fur-
ther to include homicides “committed under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.”21 
In addition to the expansion of what might constitute “adequate provoca-
tion,” modern doctrines have also expanded what it means to be “provoked” or 
“in the heat of passion.” Historically, passion was treated as synonymous with 
                                                                                                                                 
igate what would otherwise be murder to a voluntary manslaughter conviction.”); Antonia 
Elise Miller, Note, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonableness of the Concept of Reasonableness 
in the Context of Manslaughter Committed in the Heat of Passion, 17 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 249, 257 (2010) (“In today’s society . . . the typical paradigm for the use of 
voluntary manslaughter is exemplified by the facts of the Peacock case: an unsuspecting 
husband comes home and catches his wife in bed with another man.”). See also Susan D. 
Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 197, 
198–99 (2005) (“These ‘nineteenth century four’ reduce to two paradigmatic contexts, still 
the paradigms today: (1) the defendant, faced with a violent but non-deadly assault, responds 
to his attacker in the heat of passion with excessive, deadly force; and (2) the defendant, ar-
riving home early one day to discover his wife in bed with another man, in the heat of pas-
sion kills one, the other, or both.”) (citations omitted). 
19  Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CAL. L. REV. 273, 280 (2015) (discussing the 
expansion of the provocation standard) (citations omitted). 
20  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 777 (4th ed. 2003) (outlining the four require-
ments); Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse 
Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 29–30 (2009); see also Berman & Farrell, 
supra note 1, at 1040–42 (arguing that these four elements are just other ways of stating the 
only two essential requirements: that “[t]he actor must have killed while in the heat of pas-
sion” and that “[t]he heat of passion must have been brought about by adequate provoca-
tion.”). 
21  MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1980); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation 
Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 960 (2002) [here-
inafter Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?] (“In 1962, the drafters of the Model 
Penal Code provided a new, far broader vision of the defense.”); Berman & Farrell, supra 
note 1, at 1044 (“The Model Penal Code’s EMED [extreme mental or emotional disturbance] 
formulation represents a substantial reform of the provocation defense. The EMED defense 
is not restricted to loss of self-control caused by passion stemming from adequate provoca-
tion. The disturbance undermining self-control may be mental as well as emotional, and the 
emotional or mental disturbance need not arise from provoking conduct at all. When provo-
cation occurs, the EMED defense may apply regardless of whether the person killed was the 
provoker, or whether the provocation was directed at the defendant or a third party.”). 
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intense anger or rage.22 Today, however, in common law jurisdictions, passion 
is often broad enough to include emotions like fear or resentment.23 In jurisdic-
tions that follow the Model Penal Code, passion can include any “mental or 
emotional disturbance,” so long as it is “extreme.”24 The operative limitation is 
often now one of objectivity: would the emotion in question cause an “ ‘ordi-
nary person of average disposition’ ” to act “ ‘from passion rather than judg-
ment’ ”?25 Still, despite the general expansion of the definition of passion, most 
scholars agree that anger remains the quintessential case.26 
B. Normative Logic 
The normative judgment embedded in the various iterations of the provoca-
tion doctrine is that an individual motivated by intense emotion into commit-
ting an act they understand to be wrong is, while not blameless, less deserving 
of punishment than someone who acts with cool, deliberative intent.27 Courts 
sometimes characterize the difference as acting “due to anger, not evilness.”28 
The comments to the Model Penal Code frame it this way: 
                                                        
22  See, e.g., People v. Sica, 245 P. 461, 463 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1926) (“ ‘Anger’ and ‘pas-
sion’ are interchangeable, and mean practically the same thing.”) (citation omitted); Nourse, 
supra note 15, at 1341 (noting that the original four categories of the nineteenth century were 
“thought to isolate those cases in which the violation of a social or relational norm led to 
righteous anger.”). 
23  See, e.g., People v. Wu, No. E007993, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (not-
ing that “ ‘passion’ need not mean ‘rage’ or ‘anger’ but may be any ‘[v]iolent, intense, high-
wrought or enthusiastic emotion’ ”) (quoting People v. Borchers, 325 P.2d 97, 102 (Cal. 
1958)). 
24  See Coker, supra note 15, at 79 (“ ‘Passion’ has usually meant ‘anger,’ though some juris-
dictions have consistently included fear and jurisdictions that follow the Model Penal Code 
include any ‘extreme mental or emotional disturbance.’ ”). 
25  Coker, supra note 15, at 79 (citing 17 Cal. Jur. 3d (Rev.) Part 1, Criminal Law § 255 
(1984)). 
26  See Coker, supra note 15, at 102 (“If adultery is the ‘paradigm’ heat of passion event, an-
ger is the paradigm heat of passion emotion.”); Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra 
note 9, at 427 n.62 (“[A]nger is the usual emotion alleged in provocation cases . . .”); Dress-
ler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 21, at 959 n.5 (“Provocation law is all 
about emotions, most notably anger.”); Garvey, supra note 14, at 1687 n.34 (“The passion or 
emotion . . . implicated in cases of provocation is usually thought to be anger or resentment 
. . .”); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion 
Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1711–12 (1986) 
(“[R]age is still the paradigm emotion for heat of passion . . . .”). 
27  See Nikolette Y. Clavel, Righting the Wrong and Seeing Red: Heat of Passion, the Model 
Penal Code, and Domestic Violence, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 329, 333 (2012) (“The doctrine 
of common law voluntary manslaughter evolved from the recognition that those who kill in 
the heat of passion are less culpable than those who commit premeditated murders.”) (cita-
tions omitted); Fontaine, supra note 20, at 49 (“It is not the provocation that mitigates the 
defendant’s culpability and punishment, but the emotionally-charged effect that is has on 
him.”). 
28  Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 9, at 462. 
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[The provocation doctrine] is a concession to human weakness and perhaps to 
non-deterability, a recognition of the fact that one who kills in response to cer-
tain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly dif-
ferent character deficiency than one who kills in their absence . . . The underly-
ing judgment is thus that some instances of intentional homicide may be as 
much attributable to the extraordinary nature of the situation as to the moral de-
pravity of the actor.29 
This normative judgment, in turn, relies on an implicit assumption of hu-
man psychology: that intense emotion can cause an individual to deviate from 
what they believe is morally acceptable—to cause them to do something that 
they understand to be wrong and, presumably, that they would refrain from do-
ing but for the emotion.30 
While there may be a general scholarly consensus as to descriptive devel-
opment of the doctrine, there is extensive normative debate as to exactly why 
(let alone, whether), this “frailty of human nature” should mitigate the actor’s 
punishment. Entire symposiums, for example, have been staged around the 
question of whether intense emotion partially justifies the actor’s behavior (i.e., 
entitles the actor to a certain degree of retaliation), or partially excuses it (i.e., 
renders the actor less morally blameworthy).31 Other debates have centered on 
whether the mitigation is best understood under a retributive framework (e.g., 
the passionate actor is less deserving of punishment than the deliberative actor) 
or a utilitarian one (e.g., the passionate actor is less deterrable than the delibera-
tive actor).32 Even within the retributive framework—the favored explanation 
of the doctrine—there are different rationales as to why the actor is less deserv-
                                                        
29  MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) (1980). 
30  See, e.g., Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 9, at 464 (“In short, provoca-
tion is an excuse premised upon involuntariness based upon reduced choice-capabilities.”); 
Fontaine, supra note 20, at 48 (“Heat of passion reflects a mediated path by which there is an 
interpretation of provocation (cognition) that causes overwhelming anger (emotion), which, 
in turn, leads to a reactive killing (behavior).”); Garvey, supra note 14, at 1713 (analogizing 
crimes of passion to hate crimes and explaining that “[the actor’s] desire and belief are but-
for causes of his action, but they are not, so it might be put, motives for his action.”). 
31  See generally Symposium, The Nature, Structure, and Function of Heat of Pas-
sion/Provocation as a Criminal Defense, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2009); Vera Bergel-
son, Justification or Excuse? Exploring the Meaning of Provocation, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
307 (2009). 
32  Compare Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 21, at 963 (“[M]ost 
modern scholars would agree that the basis for the defense of provocation is found in retribu-
tive concepts of desert . . .”) with Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 9, at 464 
(“Anger makes us less able to respond in a legally and morally appropriate fashion.”). See 
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) (1980), supra note 29 and accompanying text 
(which combines both rationales: “[The provocation doctrine] is a concession to human 
weakness and perhaps to non-deterability . . .”); Marcia Baron, The Provocation Defense and 
the Nature of Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 127 (2009) (combining elements 
of both in noting that “[i]t is too harsh [to blame the individual] either because of some fea-
ture of the agent for which she is not culpable that rendered it very difficult for her to act as 
she should, or because the circumstances were such that it would have been very difficult for 
most people to act as they should.”) (citation omitted). 
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ing of punishment. Is it because he was incapable of forming the blameworthy 
moral judgment—the specific intent to kill, or malice aforethought—usually 
required for murder?33 Is it because he was, for the duration of the passion, de-
throned of his reasoning faculties, and was thus acting “not out of rational 
thought but out of unconsidered reaction to the provocation”?34 Or is it because 
the actor has “demonstrated fewer blameworthy character flaws than are usual-
ly observed in killers?”35 In short, the doctrine remains, as Dressler remarked 
more than three decades ago, “a [defense] in search of a . . . rationale.”36 
These arguments, however, have simply bypassed the threshold question of 
whether intense emotion—typically, anger—can actually motivate an individu-
al to behave in ways that they otherwise believe to be morally wrong. While it 
may seem common sense that anger motivates us to do things we understand to 
be wrong,37 discoveries in both the natural and behavioral sciences have repeat-
edly shown that our common sense experience is often misleading and inaccu-
rate: we observe the world as flat and motionless instead of round and revolv-
ing; we perceive motion in absolute terms instead of relative terms; we give 
good-faith explanations for our behavior that are demonstrably inaccurate; we 
“remember” events that never happened; and we consider ourselves rational 
decision-makers in spite of the fact that we frequently make sub-optimal choic-
es.38 In other words, we cannot just rely on our intuitions if we want to truly 
understand the psychological mechanics that underlie our experience of being 
“in the heat of passion.” Empirical verification is necessary. 
Importantly, an empirical examination of the doctrine holds value regard-
less of whether the assumptions embedded in the doctrine are accurate. On the 
one hand, if a state of intense anger does not in fact produce the assumed ef-
fect—that is, motivate the actor to act in a way that he or she believes morally 
unacceptable—then many of the normative debates that follow the doctrine are 
proceeding largely in vain. On the other hand, even if anger does produce the 
                                                        
33  See, e.g., State v. Lee, 321 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Wis. 1982) (citing Wisconsin Criminal Jury 
Instruction #1130, which states that heat of passion must make the actor “incapable of form-
ing and executing that distinct intent to take human life essential to murder in the first de-
gree”). 
34  People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1125 (Cal. 2013). 
35  Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 9, at 462. 
36  Id. at 432 (calling heat of passion “a doctrine in search of a modern-day rationale.”). 
37  See, e.g., Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 9, at 463, 463–64 n.299 and 
accompanying next (declaring that “I do not rely on science in this article to inform the anal-
ysis regarding the nature of anger as it affects human conduct” and noting instead that he 
relies on “our common experience.”); Stephen J. Morse, The Irreducibly Normative Nature 
of Provocation/Passion, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 193, 194 (2009) (“Most rational adults 
understand two aspects of our psychological natures. First, things that happen can make peo-
ple extremely angry. Second, we have much more difficulty behaving rationally when we are 
in states of such extreme emotion or other states that diminish rationality.”). 
38  See Carlton J. Patrick, The Long-Term Promise of Evolutionary Psychology for the Law, 
48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1007–12 (2016) (discussing and giving examples of this type of “in-
stinct blindness”). 
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assumed effect, a host of tributary questions remain: is the effect uniform for all 
behaviors, and all moral judgments, or is the actor able to act from “judgment” 
and not “passion” in some contexts? Does anger only produce a change in be-
havioral motivations, or does it also affect moral judgments as well? Asked an-
other way: does the heat of passion cause the individual not just to behave in a 
way in which he ordinarily would not, but also to believe his actions are more 
justifiable? Is the effect limited to instances of anger or rage, or does a more 
modern conception, such as the Model Penal Code’s allowance of any extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance, better capture the underlying psychological 
impetus? 
Unfortunately for lawmakers and legal scholars, the existing empirical rec-
ord is inconclusive. Despite decades of psychological research on anger, we are 
unaware of any study that directly tests the effect supposed by the doctrine. Ex-
isting theory and evidence do suggest that anger functions to orchestrate ag-
gression and punishment in response to the undervaluing of one’s welfare by 
another person.39 In other words, anger serves a recalibrational function—to 
cause the individual towards whom the anger is directed to increase the value 
that they place on the angry individual’s welfare.40 In line with this recalibra-
tional model, a large body of research demonstrates a general escalatory effect 
of anger on motivations to retaliate. Research shows, for example, that anger 
increases both the likelihood41 and severity42 of punishment, that it enhances 
                                                        
39  See, e.g., NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 198 (1986) (describing the arousal of anger 
when a person has the experience of being slighted or hurt by intentional acts of another per-
son); Aaron Sell et al., Formidability and the Logic of Human Anger, 106 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 15073, 15074 (2009) (“[W]hen the anger program detects that the other party is 
not placing ‘sufficient’ weight on the welfare of the actor, anger is triggered.”). 
40  See, e.g., Sell et al., supra note 39, at 15073 (“[T]he function of anger is to orchestrate 
behavior in the angry individual that creates incentives in the target of the anger to recali-
brate upwards the weight he or she puts on the welfare of the angry individual.”); Agneta H. 
Fischer & Ira J. Roseman, Beat Them or Ban Them: The Characteristics and Social Func-
tions of Anger and Contempt, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 103, 104 (2007) (“[T]he 
social function of anger can be conceptualized as attaining a better outcome by forcing a 
change in another person’s behavior. This function can be served by hostile or antagonistic 
behaviors, that is, by seeking confrontation or by attacking someone”). 
41  See, e.g., Julie H. Goldberg et al., Rage and Reason: The Psychology of the Intuitive 
Prosecutor, 29 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 781, 781 (1999) (finding that anger aroused by the 
belief that an injustice occurred “lower[ed] . . . thresholds for making attributions of harmful 
intent”); Madan M. Pillutla & J. Keith Murnighan, Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional 
Rejections of Ultimatum Offers, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
208, 215–19 (1996) (finding that anger predicted retaliation in ultimatum game experi-
ments). 
42  See, e.g., Leah C. Georges et al., The Angry Juror: Sentencing Decisions in First-Degree 
Murder, 27 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 156, 160–63 (2013) (finding that as mock jurors’ 
anger increased, the more likely they were to assign a death sentence, and the weaker their 
ratings of mitigating factors). 
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motivation for social dominance,43 increases a tolerance for risk,44 and increas-
es a willingness to endure additional personal costs in order to mete out pun-
ishment.45 
The question of how this well-established effect interacts with the angry 
individual’s moral judgments, however, is a novel one. The overarching short-
coming of the existing literature is that studies generally include only two of 
the three variables of interest (i.e. anger, motivation, and moral judgment). 
Studies examining the motivational effects of anger, for example, have typical-
ly not included measures of how morally acceptable (or unacceptable) partici-
pants believe their actions to be.46 Studies focusing on the effects of anger on 
moral judgment have likewise not included independent measures of motiva-
tion or behavior,47 and moreover tend to focus on how anger influences moral 
judgments as to the actions of others,48 or of behavior or punishment in the ab-
stract.49 Because moral judgments as to the behavior of others may be generat-
ed by a set of psychological mechanisms that are distinct from those used to 
generate moral judgments as to the behavior of the self, however, it can be 
problematic to generalize from one class of studies to the other.50 
                                                        
43  See generally Larissa Z. Tiedens, Anger and Advancement Versus Sadness and Subjuga-
tion: The Effect of Negative Emotion Expressions on Social Status Conferral, 80 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 86 (2001). 
44  See Daniel M.T. Fessler et al., Angry Men and Disgusted Women: An Evolutionary Ap-
proach to the Influence of Emotions on Risk Taking, 95 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 107, 116 (2004) (finding that anger increases risk taking in men); Jen-
nifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 146, 146 (2001) (explaining the finding that “angry people expressed optimistic 
risk estimates and risk-seeking choices.”). 
45  See generally Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 
NATURE 137 (2002); Elise C. Seip et al., Anger Motivates Costly Punishment of Unfair Be-
havior, 38 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 578 (2014). 
46  See, e.g., supra notes 39–45. 
47  See, e.g., Evan Polman & Rachel L. Ruttan, Effects of Anger, Guilt, and Envy on Moral 
Hypocrisy, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 129, 133 (2012) (angered participants 
rating the acceptability of hypothetical moral transgressions instead of measuring their will-
ingness or motivations to transgress). 
48  See, e.g., Matúš Grežo & L’ubor Pilárik, Anger and Moral Reasoning in Decision Mak-
ing, 4 J. EUR. PSYCHOL. STUDENTS 56, 62 (2013) (evaluating participants’ anger and moral 
judgments with respect to punishment options in the abstract, not with respect to how partic-
ipants own punishment decisions). 
49  See, e.g., Jessica M. Salerno & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, The Interactive Effect of Anger 
and Disgust on Moral Outrage and Judgments, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2069, 2070–71 (2013) 
(discussing participants’ assessment of anger and moral outrage toward defendant in vi-
gnettes). 
50  See Kelly Asao & David M. Buss, The Tripartite Theory of Machiavellian Morality: 
Judgment, Influence, and Conscience as Distinct Moral Adaptations, in THE EVOLUTION OF 
MORALITY 6–7 (Todd K. Shackleford & Ranald D. Hansen eds., 2016) (outlining the differ-
ence between the psychological mechanisms and moral judgments generated with respect to 
the self on one hand and conspecifics on the other); Peter DeScioli & Robert Kurzban, Mys-
teries of Morality, 112 COGNITION 281, 285–86 (2009) (explaining the separate psychologi-
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A few studies have attempted to examine how anger and related emotions 
influence decisions to engage in “unethical” or “immoral” behavior, but be-
cause these studies generally do not measure how morally acceptable the par-
ticipants believe their own actions to be, they are also generally inconclusive.51 
As a result, we can only assume that the participants viewed the acts as immor-
al; we are unable to rule out the hypothesis that the angry individuals believed 
their behavior—as a result of their anger or otherwise—to be morally justified. 
In sum, existing research does not allow us to sufficiently answer the true ques-
tion at the heart of the provocation doctrine: do angry individuals behave in 
ways that they otherwise believe to be wrong? 
II. PRIOR RESEARCH: MORAL CONSCIENCE, MOTIVATION, AND EMOTIONS 
While there are no studies directly addressing the question at the heart of 
the doctrine, other existing research does allow us to make certain predictions 
regarding the three-way interaction between moral judgments, behavioral moti-
vations, and emotions. 
One prominent theory, for example, suggests that the function of our moral 
conscience—the subjective feeling that personally taking a particular action is, 
or would be, “right” or “wrong”—is to predict the probable judgment of others 
and guide behavior in order to avoid punishment and social condemnation.52 In 
this view, our moral conscience can be thought of as a forecasting instrument 
that computes the expected social consequences of a particular action and then 
consciously delivers a moral judgment or intuition with regard to that action.53 
Expected positive outcomes (social praise, positive gossip, increases in reputa-
tion, elevated social standing) are encouraged by tagging prospective actions 
with sensations such as right, good, virtuous, or justified, while expected nega-
tive outcomes (revenge, negative gossip, loss of reputation, social ostracism, 
                                                                                                                                 
cal functions of moral conscience and moral condemnation based on whether the judgment 
refers to behavior of the self or the behavior of others). 
51  See generally Rimma Teper et al., How Emotions Shape Moral Behavior: Some Answers 
(and Questions) for the Field of Moral Psychology, 9 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. 
COMPASS 1 (2015); cf. Dan Ariely & George Loewenstein, The Heat of the Moment: The 
Effect of Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision Making, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 87, 94 
(2006) (finding that sexual arousal increased participants’ willingness to engage in morally 
questionable behavior where “morally questionable” was defined by the authors–participants 
did not rate the morality of their actions). 
52  See Peter DeScioli & Robert Kurzban, A Solution to the Mysteries of Morality, 139 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 477, 487–88 (explaining moral conscience as a mechanism for anticipation 
and avoiding condemnation by third parties); Asao & Buss, supra note 50, at 5 (“[M]oral 
conscience, is a set of psychological mechanisms designed to guide one’s own behavior to-
ward others to avoid negative fitness consequences as a result of judgment and influence 
mechanisms in others.”); Dan Sperber & Nicolas Baumard, Moral Reputation: An Evolu-
tionary and Cognitive Perspective, 27 MIND & LANGUAGE 495, 495 (2012) (explaining that, 
from an evolutionary point of view, the function of moral behavior may be to secure a good 
reputation as a co-operator). 
53  Sperber & Baumard, supra note 52, at 495. 
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and other forms of individual or community punishment) are discouraged by 
tagging prospective actions with sensations such as wrong, bad, shameful, or 
unjustified.54 Accordingly, humans should, all other things being equal, gener-
ally behave in accordance with their moral conscience—that is, people should 
typically be motivated to do what they feel is right and to refrain from what 
they feel is wrong.55 
Often, however, all other things are not equal. In some situations, the over-
all advantages56 of engaging in a particular behavior might outweigh the ex-
pected negative social consequences: when there is little chance of a moral 
transgression being detected,57 when the individual is in a position of power 
and can “afford” reputational harm,58 when the individual is already a social 
outcast and has little to fear from social devaluation,59 when complying means 
                                                        
54  See DeScioli & Kurzban, supra note 50, at 287 (“Conscience, on the present view, is a 
cognitive system that uses the moral concepts ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to guide actor behavior.”); 
Sperber & Baumard, supra note 52, at 509 (Discussing the concern for one’s reputation as an 
intuitive mechanism guiding “the moral sense,” which “provides intuitions about what is 
right and wrong and involves moral sentiments with motivating power.”). 
55  See, e.g., Sperber & Baumard, supra note 52, at 497 (“Moral emotions are a signal of 
trustworthiness only to the extent that the underlying moral judgment is itself trustworthy 
and actually guides the individual’s behaviour.”). See generally Jerome Kagan, Human Mo-
rality and Temperament, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: VOL. 51. MORAL 
MOTIVATION THROUGH THE LIFE SPAN (Gustavo Carlo & Carolyn Pope Edwards eds., 2005). 
56  We use the terms “advantages,” “benefits,” and “payoffs” in their evolved psychological 
sense—meaning, advantages/benefits/payoffs in terms of increased survival and reproduc-
tion over evolutionary time. We do not use these terms in the way they are commonly used 
and understood in an economic sense, to convey net payoffs measured from a contemporary 
perspective of economic rationality. In many cases, we should expect the two to differ. See 
Carlton J. Patrick, A New Synthesis for Law and Emotions: Insights from the Behavioral Sci-
ences, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1239, 1271–77 (2015) for a discussion of this distinction in terms of 
emotions and the law. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Better than Rational: Evolution-
ary Psychology and the Invisible Hand, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 327 (1994) for an explanation of 
this idea, generally. 
57  See, e.g., DeScioli & Kurzban, supra note 50, at 290 (covering evidence from studies that 
indicates moral conscience allows immoral behavior when condemnation is unlikely). 
58  See, e.g., Craig Haney et al., A Study of Prisoners and Guards in a Simulated Prison, 30 
NAVAL RESEARCH REV. 1 (1973) (discussing a simulated prison experiment that divided par-
ticipants randomly into prisoner and guard roles, and where the power granted to the guards 
resulted in aggression and cruelty towards the “prisoner” participants); Sell et al., supra note 
39, at 15075–77 (finding that individuals with characteristics, such as strength in men or 
physical attractiveness in women, that render them less vulnerable to social devaluation are 
more prone to entitlement and to endorse the utility of personal aggression). 
59  See, e.g., MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 124 (1988) (outlining the most 
common profile of killers in a study of Detroit homicides as “nobodies: unpropertied and 
unmarried, little educated, often unemployed.”); STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF 
OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 396 (2011) (“Among humans, the male may 
use coercion to get sex when certain risk factors line up: when he is violent, callous, and 
reckless by temperament; when he is a loser who cannot attract sexual partners by other 
means; when he is an outcast and has little fear of opprobrium from the community; and 
when he senses that the risks of punishment are low, such as during conquests and pog-
roms.”). 
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contravening authority, risking physical danger, or incurring other prohibitively 
high personal costs,60 when other reputational losses, such as the loss of percep-
tion of formidability, outweigh the risk of condemnation,61 or when the overall 
benefits of transgressing are so high that the net calculus favors risking any 
negative social consequences.62 Thus, while the moral conscience may serve as 
one input for behavior, there are also many instances in which moral con-
science and behavior might not match one-to-one.63 In such instances, an indi-
vidual might feel that a particular course of action would be the “right thing to 
do” and yet not be motivated to act, or conversely experience a willingness to 
engage in a behavior that the individual simultaneously believes to be 
“wrong.”64 
Applying the view that emotions function to coordinate cognitive, behav-
ioral, and physiological mechanisms to respond to certain recurrent classes of 
events, it follows that emotions could conceivably affect this dynamic between 
motivation and moral conscience in a variety of ways, depending heavily on 
context and the particular design features of the emotion in question.65 For ex-
                                                        
60  See, e.g., Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 371 (1963) (where participants administered electric shocks to a confederate at the 
direction of the scientist running the experiment); John M Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander 
Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
377, 379–81 (1968) (where participants did not aid a confederate faking a seizure when they 
believed other individuals were present). 
61  See, e.g., DALY & WILSON, supra note 59, at 128 (“Men are known by their fellows as 
‘the sort who can be pushed around’ or ‘the sort who won’t take any shit,’ as people whose 
word means action and people who are full of hot air, as guys whose girlfriends you can chat 
up with impunity or guys you don’t want to mess with. In most social milieus, a man’s repu-
tation depends in part upon the maintenance of a credible threat of violence.”). See generally 
RICHARD E. NISBETT & DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN 
THE SOUTH (1996). 
62  See Francesca Gino, Understanding Ordinary Unethical Behavior: Why People Who Val-
ue Morality Act Immorally, 3 CURRENT OPINION BEHAV. SCI. 107, 108–09 (2015) (covering 
studies in which individuals understand their behavior to be immoral and yet chose to engage 
when presented with the opportunity). 
63  See id.; see also DeScioli & Kurzban, supra note 50, at 286 (explaining that actor con-
science competes with other motivations). 
64  See Patrick, supra note 56, at 1268–69 (discussing the phenomenon of two mental pro-
cesses conflicting with each other and listing some common examples) (citing, among oth-
ers, JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT 
WISDOM 4–5 (2006) (“To understand most important ideas in psychology, you need to un-
derstand how the mind is divided into parts that sometimes conflict. We assume that there is 
one person in each body, but in in some ways we are each more like a committee whose 
members have been thrown together to do a job, but who often find themselves working at 
cross purposes.”)). But see Albert Bandura et al., Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in 
the Exercise of Moral Agency, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 364, 370–72 (1996) 
(discussing findings showing “moral disengagement”). 
65  See Nico H. Frijda, The Laws of Emotion, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 349, 349–50 (1988) 
(explaining emotions as responses to particular types of events); John Tooby & Leda Cos-
mides, The Evolutionary Psychology of the Emotions and Their Relationship to Internal 
Regulatory Variables, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 114, 117–18 (Michel Lewis et al. eds., 3d 
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ample, some emotions are thought to be explicitly yoked to the outputs gener-
ated by the forecasting mechanisms of our moral conscience. These “moral 
emotions” such as shame, guilt, or embarrassment are thought to function spe-
cifically to move behavior towards our moral intuitions of right or wrong in 
cases where projected social devaluation would exceed other expected bene-
fits.66 One recent study, for instance, indicates that shame operates from an ex 
ante position to deter individuals from taking actions that would “cost” them 
more in terms of social devaluation than the other benefits the action would 
otherwise yield.67 Another study found that the induction of guilt increased pro-
social behavior only when it did not come at a personal cost to the participant.68 
Other emotions, in other contexts, might function in the opposite manner, 
driving motivation away from judgments of moral acceptability when the over-
all expected benefits for doing so exceed expected social devaluation. For in-
stance, emotions such as fear or disgust that function to help humans avoid po-
tential threats might work to constrain motivation below the levels suggested 
by our moral conscience in instances where the risk of potential threats—
physical or otherwise—reduce the expected payoffs of the action below the 
reputational value that would be gained by “doing the right thing.”69 Consider, 
for example, the much-publicized murder of Kitty Genovese, a murder that was 
observed by numerous frightened witnesses who chose not to intervene or even 
to call the police.70 
                                                                                                                                 
ed. 2008) (characterizing emotions are superordinate coordinating programs that evolved to 
respond to certain recurrent classes of events). 
66  See generally June Price Tangney et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 345 (2007). 
67  Daniel Sznycer et al., Shame Closely Tracks the Threat of Devaluation by Others, Even 
Across Cultures¸ 113 PROC. NAT’L ACADEMY SCI. 2625, 2626 (2016) (“[S]hame is elicited by 
the prospect or actuality of negative information about the individual reaching others. Its 
neurocognitive architecture is designed to: (i) deter the individual from taking courses of ac-
tion that would cost more in terms of social devaluation than the payoffs the action would 
otherwise yield . . .”). 
68  Ilona E. de Hooge et al., What Is Moral About Guilt? Acting “Prosocially” at the Disad-
vantage of Others, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 462, 467–71 (2011). 
69  See Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 65, at 117–18 (discussing the safety-prioritizing fea-
tures of fear); see also Fessler et al., supra note 44, at 116 (finding that disgust decreases 
risk-taking in women); Lerner & Keltner, supra note 44, at 146 (explaining the finding that 
fearful people expressed pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse choices). 
70  The precise details of the murder are disputed. As originally reported by the New York 
Times, “38 respectable, law-abiding citizens in Queens watched a killer stalk and stab a 
woman in three separate attacks in Kew Gardens . . . . Not one person telephoned – the po-
lice during the assault; one witness called after the woman was dead.” Martin Gansberg, 37 
Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 1964), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/27/37-who-saw-murder-didnt-call-the-police.html?mcubz 
=1 [https://perma.cc/W74G-2AZS]. Later accounts have insisted that this number was exag-
gerated, and that at least one witness shouted at the man to stop, and at least two called the 
police. However, at least one witness saw the attack, did nothing, and then took a nap rather 
than helping Genovese. Another opened a door, saw Genovese being stabbed, became 
scared, and closed the door. See generally, Nicholas Lemann, A Call for Help: What the Kit-
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Heat of passion is concerned with a third possibility: that emotions could 
function to increase motivation beyond the level of acceptability generated by 
the moral conscience. Again, by hypothesis, many emotions could contribute to 
motivation exceeding moral conscience in contexts where the overall expected 
benefits from engaging in a particular act outweigh the expected social conse-
quences. This is especially true of those emotions whose design features typi-
cally include increases in approach tendencies or behavioral motivation, like 
jealousy, love, sexual arousal, and, most saliently for heat of passion, anger.71 
While not directly supportive, the classic “heat of the moment” study by Ariely 
and Loewenstein is both illustrative and consistent with this theory.72 In that 
study, male participants answered a series of questions about their willingness 
to engage in certain sexual behaviors, both in a sexually aroused and in an un-
aroused state.73 The study found that participants were significantly more likely 
to engage in many morally questionable behaviors (such as encouraging a date 
to drink or slipping her a drug to increase the chance that she would have sex) 
while in the aroused condition, suggesting that sexual arousal increased motiva-
tion beyond what the participants would do in a sexually un-aroused state.74 
The specific assumption typically nested within the heat of passion frame-
work is that anger pushes behavioral motivations beyond the level that the indi-
vidual deems morally appropriate. Or, as it is commonly phrased, the individual 
proceeds not “from a bad or corrupt heart, but rather from the infirmity of pas-
sion to which even good men are subject.”75 As previously outlined, while ex-
isting research has robustly demonstrated the motivational effects of anger, the 
relationship of this effect to judgments of moral acceptability—that is to say, 
the assumption at the heart of the doctrine—remains an open question. 
Here, we tested this assumption in the context of the quintessential heat of 
passion case: a man witnessing or discovering the infidelity of his significant 
other.76 Specifically, we tested whether, among males who had experienced the 
                                                                                                                                 
ty Genovese Story Really Means, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/10/a-call-for-help [https://perma.cc/N53V-
ANQR] (outlining the disputed facts in the case and describing the facts as we now under-
stand them). 
71  See Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 65, at 125 (discussing the different motivational prop-
erties of emotions and noting as an example that “a loss of face should increase the motiva-
tion to take advantage of opportunities for status advancement, and should decrease attention 
to attendant costs.”). 
72  Ariely & Loewenstein, supra note 51. 
73  Id. at 89–90. 
74  Id. at 91–95. But, again, because the study did not include measures of the participants’ 
moral judgments of their behavior, it is impossible to draw any concrete conclusions about 
this effect in relation to how acceptable participants believed those actions to be. Cf. Andrew 
Galperin et al., Sexual Regret: Evidence for Evolved Sex Differences, 42 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 1145 (2013) (finding that both men and women, but women moreso, tend to regret 
casual sexual encounters after the fact). 
75  Paz v. State, 777 So. 2d 983, 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). 
76  Supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
18 NEV. L.J. 33, PATRICK LIEBERMAN - FINAL.DOCX 1/2/18  10:44 AM 
48 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:33  
discovery of a partner’s adultery, anger could increase motivations to retaliate 
beyond what the individual judged as morally acceptable. 
III. THE PRESENT STUDY 
If the moral judgment/motivation dynamic at the core of the provocation 
doctrine is dependent on the various motivational, moral, and emotional mech-
anisms suggested by prior research, we should expect to observe the following 
psychological patterns: first, if moral conscience is a primary driver of behav-
ioral motivations, then participants’ judgments of moral acceptability should 
generally correlate with their behavioral motivations (prediction #1); second, to 
the extent that the correlation is not perfect, anger may have a greater effect on 
motivation than moral judgments (prediction #2), in which case anger should 
also account for variation in behavioral motivations beyond what can be ac-
counted for by judgments of moral acceptability (prediction #3). However, this 
effect should not be uniform with respect to all behaviors: because anger func-
tions to orchestrate aggression and punishment (or the threat of punishment) in 
order to increase the value placed of the angry individual’s welfare, anger 
should motivate behavior beyond moral judgments of acceptability only to the 




Our sample consisted of 1,966 adult males residing in the United States. 
Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to complete an 
online survey administered through Qualitrics. Participants received monetary 
compensation for completing the survey, which was advertised as a “relation-
ship survey” in which participants would be asked “a series of questions about 
a past relationship and about how you felt in that relationship.” Of this sample, 
1,236 (63 percent) met the participation criteria of having discovered the infi-
delity of significant other in a current or previous relationship. Twenty-seven 
participants were excluded after admitting to not meeting the participation cri-
teria (after completing the survey and being assured of compensation regard-
less), yielding a total of 1,209 participants. 
2. Materials and Procedure 
After passing the screening requirements, participants completed a series of 
items related to the circumstances surrounding their discovery of their partner’s 
infidelity. Each participant answered two open-ended questions that required a 
minimum of 250-character responses. The first question asked participants to: 
Please take 2–3 minutes and describe in a short paragraph the circumstances 
around the infidelity, what your partner did, and how you discovered it. The 
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second question asked participants to: Please take a moment to recollect how 
the harmful incident made you feel. Take 2–3 minutes and describe what you 
felt like in the moment you discovered your partner had been unfaithful. Partic-
ipants then reported how angry the discovery made the participants on a five 
point Likert-type77 scale ranging from not angry at all to extremely angry, and 
completed two sections designed to measure both motivational and moral re-
sponses to the incident. 
The motivation section presented participants with six retaliatory behaviors 
and asked them to recall and rate how much they wanted to engage in such be-
haviors on a five point Likert-type scale ranging from not at all to extremely 
badly. The behaviors consisted of three retaliatory behaviors salient to the func-
tion of anger in this context (i.e., to increase the value placed on the partici-
pant’s welfare): (1) yell at my partner, (2) push my partner, (3) hit or slap my 
partner; and three behaviors not salient to the function of anger in this context 
(i.e. that might harm the partner but would not be expected to increase the value 
placed on the participant’s welfare): (4) steal money from my partner, (5) walk 
away from the relationship and never see her again, and (6) gossip about my 
partner to ruin her reputation.78 The moral section presented participants with 
the same behaviors and asked them to rate how justified they would have been 
to have engaged in such behaviors on a five point Likert-type scale ranging 
from not justified at all to completely justified.79 All questions were randomized 
within sections. All analyses were completed in SPSS Version 24. 
                                                        
77  A Likert-type scale is a common method in psychological research, usually used in sur-
veys or questionnaires, where participants provide answers or ratings along a (typically) five 
or seven-point scale that varies by degree. For example, a participant might be asked how 
much they agree with a particular statement, and are given five options: (1) Strongly Disa-
gree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neither Agree nor Disagree, (4) Agree, (5) Strongly Agree. See gen-
erally Gail M. Sullivan & Anthony R. Artino, Jr., Editorial, Analyzing and Interpreting Data 
from Likert-Type Scales, 5 J. GRADUATE MED. EDUC. 541, 541–42 (2013). 
78  Unlike yelling, pushing, and striking, the latter three behaviors (stealing money, gossip-
ing, and walking away) do not involve the same direct aggression designed to alter the other 
individual’s behavior. For example, stealing money and gossiping are passively aggressive, 
and involve taking action that is usually unbeknownst to the person towards whom they are 
directed. If the other individual does not know about the retaliation, their valuation on the 
actor’s welfare cannot be recalibrated. In a similar vein, permanently walking away also 
forecloses the possibility of recalibration. Compounding this effect is that, given the dynamic 
of the participants (i.e. male towards female), physical violence and threats of physical vio-
lence carry a greater chance of effectiveness and a reduced chance of retaliation, due to the 
average difference in strength and physical stature. See Sell et al., supra note 39, at 15073–
78 (explaining the logic of these differences and showing this dichotomy in a study compar-
ing the relationship among strength, anger, and aggression between men and women). For an 
interesting discussion of how wife-killing can be driven by a process designed to recalibrate 
welfare valuations, see Joshua D. Duntley & David M. Buss, The Plausibility of Adaptations 
for Homicide, in THE INNATE MIND: STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS (Peter Carruthers et al. eds., 
2005). 
79  Moral acceptability is operationalized here as participant evaluation of how justified their 
action would have been. Compare Justify, “to show to be just, right, or in accord with rea-
son.” WEBSTER NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, THIRD EDITION 734 (2005), with Moral, “good 
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B. Analysis and Results 
 To assess the various associations among the variables, we conducted a se-
ries of correlational analyses between (1) motivation and moral judgments, (2) 
anger and motivation, and (3) anger and moral judgments. We also conducted 
partial correlation analyses between (4) anger and motivation while controlling 
for moral judgments, and (5) anger and moral judgments while controlling for 
motivation. Figure 1 presents these five correlational relationships for each of 
the six behaviors. 
FIGURE 1. CORRELATIONS AMONG ANGER, MOTIVATION, AND MORAL JUDGMENTS FOR 
EACH BEHAVIOR. ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS ARE REPORTED OUTSIDE OF THE LINES, 
PARTIAL CORRELATIONS ARE REPORTED INSIDE OF LINES. ALL CORRELATIONS ABOVE .05 
WERE SIGNIFICANT AT A MINIMUM LEVEL OF P < .01. ALL CORRELATIONS .05 OR LOWER 
WERE NOT SIGNIFICANT. 
As predicted, there were significant correlations between motivation and 
moral judgment for all six behaviors. Moreover, anger (M = 4.11, SD = 1.02) 
was significantly positively correlated (zero-order) with all six motivational 
items, as well as all six moral acceptability items. However, z-tests designed to 
measure the relative correlations for each behavior revealed that the correla-
tions between anger and motivation were significantly stronger than the corre-
lations between anger and moral acceptability for: yell z = 9.17, p < .001, push 
z = 5.31, p < .001, hit or slap z = 5.96, p < .001, but not for steal money z = .42, 
p = .677, walk away z = 1.60, p = .109, gossip z = 1.88, p = .059 (all two-
tailed).80 In other words, while higher levels of anger were associated with both 
                                                                                                                                 
or right in conduct or character;” WEBSTER NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, THIRD EDITION 882 
(2005). 
80  See Ihno A. Lee & Kristopher J. Preacher, Calculation for the Test of the Difference Be-
tween Two Dependent Correlations with One Variable in Common (Sept. 2013), 
http://quantpsy.org/corrtest/corrtest2.htm [https://perma.cc/3XYA-HUXX] (for computer 
software that executes the test for comparing correlations sharing a variable); see also James 
H. Steiger, Tests for Comparing Elements of a Correlation Matrix, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 245, 
245–47 (1980) (explaining the theoretical underpinnings of the test). 
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increased motivation and increased judgments of moral acceptability, the asso-
ciation with anger was significantly stronger with motivation only for those 
behaviors salient to anger’s function (see Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2. Z-SCORES (TWO-TAILED) OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CORRELATION OF 
ANGER WITH MOTIVATION AND THE CORRELATION OF ANGER WITH JUDGMENTS OF MORAL 
ACCEPTABILITY. *** P < .001. 
Next, when controlling for moral acceptability, anger remained significant-
ly positively correlated with motivation for all behaviors except stealing mon-
ey. Conversely, while controlling for motivation, anger remained significantly 
positively correlated with judgments of moral acceptability for walk away and 
gossip, but not for steal money, yell, push, or hit or slap. Thus, most saliently 
for the heat of passion doctrine, and as shown both in Figure 1 and in Figure 3, 
the relationship between anger and participants’ judgments of moral acceptabil-
ity for yelling, pushing, and hitting or slapping their partner could be entirely 
accounted for by anger’s association with motivation, but the reverse was not 
true: anger predicted motivation to yell and engage in physical violence beyond 
what could be predicted by judgments of moral acceptability. 
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FIGURE 3. CORRELATION EFFECT SIZES BETWEEN ANGER AND MOTIVATION, AND ANGER 
AND MORAL ACCEPTABILITY, EACH AT A ZERO-ORDER LEVEL AND WHILE CONTROLLING 
FOR THE OTHER VARIABLE. ** P < .01, *** P < .001. 
Because motivation and moral acceptability were rated on different Likert-
type scales, we cannot draw any concrete conclusions by comparing their re-
spective means. However, the various effects demonstrated via our correlation-
al analyses at least appear to be corroborated by the relative change of means 
for motivation and moral judgments at the different levels of anger. As Figure 4 
illustrates, the relationship among the three measures varies depending on the 
behavior in question. 
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FIGURE 4. MEAN LEVELS OF REPORTED MOTIVATION AND JUDGMENTS OF MORAL 
ACCEPTABILITY. 
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 For stealing money, the ratings of motivation and moral acceptability are 
nearly identical on their respective scales at every level, despite the very large 
standard deviations in answers. For walking away, judgments of moral accept-
ability are higher than motivation on their respective scales at every stage of 
anger. By comparison, with respect to yelling or gossiping, at low levels of an-
ger, participants had higher ratings for moral acceptability than motivation, but 
at high levels of anger, these two judgments collapse or, in the case of yelling, 
reverse—so that motivation ratings now exceed moral judgments on their re-
spective scales. The most salient behaviors for the heat of passion doctrine—
the two physical violence measures—have a similar pattern. At low levels of 
anger, the ratings are nearly identical (both extremely low) on their respective 
scales. But at higher levels of anger, the two begin to separate, with motivation 
ratings exceeding moral acceptability ratings on their respective scales. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Four predictions regarding the psychology of provocation derived from the 
existing theoretical literature were either fully or partially supported. These 
findings provide evidence that (a) moral judgments and motivation are general-
ly correlated, (b) anger has a stronger association with motivation to engage in 
certain retaliatory behaviors than with moral judgments as to how justified such 
behaviors would be, (c) anger can account for variation in motivation beyond 
what can be accounted for by judgments of moral acceptability, and (d) that 
these effects are specific to those behaviors that are salient to the function of 
anger. Taken together, these findings lend support to a longstanding psycholog-
ical assumption of human behavior in the law—that individuals in a heightened 
state of anger may behave in ways that they do not otherwise feel are morally 
acceptable.  
That support, however, is accompanied by an extensive set of caveats. 
While our results support the general logic of the doctrine, they also call other 
more specific aspects, and particular variations, of the rule into question. More-
over, there are methodological limitations inherent in our approach, and a risk 
of extracting erroneous normative conclusions from purely descriptive tests. 
We discuss these limitations, as well as other normative implications, below. 
A. Study Limitations 
Like all empirical studies, ours has its own set of methodological limita-
tions. Among them are the following four. 
First, the retrospective nature of the study means that participants are being 
asked to recall how they felt during an event that may have occurred years or 
even decades ago. The validity of the participants’ responses depends on their 
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ability to accurately recall these events and feelings—an ability that can be at-
tenuated by a number of things, including both time and intervening events.81 
Second, the study was designed to test the psychological mechanisms that 
underlie behavioral decisions made ‘in the heat passion,’ but, out of fear that 
participants would not respond honestly, we did not obtain measures of (a) 
what participants actually did, as opposed to what they were motivated to do, or 
(b) whether participants were motivated to actually kill their unfaithful partner. 
Thus, conclusions as to whether these results extend to either of those condi-
tions require an additional level of inference.82 
Third, there are well-documented problems with relying on Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (“MTurk”) samples in psychological research. MTurk “workers” 
who complete surveys for money tend to be, compared to the general popula-
tion: younger, overeducated, underemployed, less religious, and more liberal, 
with Asians being overrepresented and Blacks and Hispanics underrepresent-
ed.83 Moreover, many MTurk workers tend to be “expert” participants, who be-
come familiarized with many of the common methodologies used for psycho-
logical research, suggesting that their responses might be different from the 
traditionally “naïve” subjects.84 These factors cast doubt on what researchers 
call the “external validity”—or the ability to generalize to the population at 
large—of inferences made using MTurk samples. 
Finally, the study is not experimental and so we are limited in our ability to 
draw conclusions about causality. While we are able to conclude that the asso-
ciation of anger is stronger with motivation than with moral judgments, and 
that anger can explain variation in motivation that cannot be accounted for by 
how morally acceptable participants believed those actions to be, we are unable 
to definitely conclude that anger causes this discrepancy. That being said, it 
would be extremely difficult from a practical perspective—and precarious from 
an ethical perspective—to recreate the conditions of a typical provocation sce-
                                                        
81  See generally Elizabeth Loftus, Our Changeable Memories: Legal and Practical Implica-
tions, 4 NATURE REVIEWS: NEUROSCIENCE 231 (2003). But see Dorthe Berntsen & David C. 
Rubin, Emotionally Charged Autobiographical Memories Across the Life Span: The Recall 
of Happy, Sad, Traumatic, and Involuntary Memories, 17 PSYCHOL. & AGING 636, 642–46 
(2002) (showing that emotional experiences are remembered more vividly and forgotten 
more slowly than neutral events). 
82  But see infra Section IV(B). 
83  Gabriele Paolacci & Jesse Chandler, Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as 
a Participant Pool, 23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 184, 185 (2013) (“In general, 
workers are diverse but not representative of the populations they are drawn from, reflecting 
that the Internet users differ systematically from non-Internet users. Workers tend to be 
younger (about 30 years old), overeducated, underemployed, less religious, and more liberal 
than the general population. Within the United States, Asians are overrepresented and Blacks 
and Hispanics are underrepresented relative to the population as a whole.”) (citations omit-
ted). 
84  See Jesse Chandler et al., Using Nonnaive Participants Can Reduce Effect Sizes, 26 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1131, 1137–38 (2015) (summarizing the effects of exposure to research mate-
rials on effect sizes). 
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nario and induce the levels of anger necessary for study in a lab. Instead, we 
accepted the limitations inherent in using recall to study a sample of individuals 
that hew closely to the archetypal real-world case. 
B. Normative Implications 
The enterprise of the behavioral sciences is ultimately a descriptive one—
to explain why and how humans behave in the ways that they do. The enter-
prise of the law, on the other hand, is driven by normative objectives: to choose 
a socially desirable state of affairs and push human behavior towards that state 
of affairs. In the end, any behavioral insights, including our results here, can 
only inform such normative questions, not decide them. Thus, while there are 
normative lessons to be gleaned from these results, we suggest caution with de-
riving any immediate prescriptions. 
Our study supports the idea that angry individuals may behave in certain 
ways that they feel are morally unacceptable, and ways that individuals in calm 
and collected states would not. Another way to state or interpret these results is 
that, at low levels of anger, judgments as to how justified or morally acceptable 
a behavior is carry more weight in determining motivation to act than they do at 
high levels of anger. That being said, our results here do nothing to settle 
why—or whether—acting in the heat of passion should mitigate punishment.85 
Our results do not answer, for example, the complicated questions that revolve 
around whether the capacity to act in the heat of passion is a less “blamewor-
thy” character flaw than calculated bad intent, as some courts and scholars pos-
it,86 or whether such individuals are less deserving of punishment. These policy 
questions are part of a separate enterprise.87 
While such questions remain open, our findings here do add some clarity to 
various components of the calculation. Take, for example, the question of 
whether the individual is acting “without reason.” Our results make clear that 
there is a definite logic to the provoked actor’s behavior, even where that logic 
is not consciously accessible. Anger, at high levels, appears to override judg-
ments of moral acceptability, and does so in consistent, predictable ways. An-
ger, for example, does not influence one’s motivation to walk away from a rela-
tionship or to spread nasty gossip about one’s partner over and above its 
influence on judgments of how acceptable it would be to do so. It does, howev-
er, coincide with a motivation to yell, push, or to hit one’s partner beyond what 
judgments of moral acceptability would dictate. In other words, anger does not 
                                                        
85  See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text. 
86  See e.g., notes 33 and 35. 
87  See Patrick, supra note 56, at 1286 (“By deconstructing the functions and operations of 
moral intuitions . . . we avoid being wooed by their subconscious origins and falling prey to 
the naturalistic fallacy. That is, we avoid making the assumption that what is natural is per se 
good, and avoid committing the logical fallacy of assuming ought from is.”) (citing Owen D. 
Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 485 
n.234 (2005)). 
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flip a switch that results in random, unpredictable behavior; anger reliably en-
trains one’s motivational systems in a way that is consistent with its ultimate 
function—to increase the value others place on one’s welfare. This is stated 
perhaps most succinctly by Kyron Huigens, who notes that 
The insane actor acts against reason, but the provoked actor does not. Very 
much to the contrary: the provoked actor acts for reasons. The paradigmatic 
cuckolded husband acts as he does for the reason that he has been cuckolded. He 
might not act with cool deliberation, but he does act for a reason.88 
In a similar vein, our results also question the conclusion that acts commit-
ted in the heat of passion are somehow less deterrable than acts that are made 
with calculated deliberation. Instead, our results are consistent with the theory 
that the various moral, emotional, and motivational systems at play in a typical 
heat of passion scenario are actually engaged in a sophisticated cost-benefit 
analysis that weighs the potential benefits of certain behaviors against the po-
tential negative consequences of engaging in them.89 And while further re-
search is needed to hone in on the exact parameters of these systems and the 
degree to which the threat of punishment can influence our moral judgments 
and behavioral motivations, it is reasonable to conclude that the threats of pun-
ishment and social condemnation (often through our moral conscience) have an 
effect on our motivations to act.90 After all, for every one individual who kills 
in the heat passion, there are scores of others who might be similarly enraged, 
but refrain from acting. This sentiment is vividly demonstrated by participants’ 
answers to our prompt to describe what you felt like in the moment you discov-
ered your partner’s infidelity, which included, for example: 
I felt like killing someone. I swear I could’ve lifted a car; 
I was ready to kill both of them; 
I still do not know how I managed to not kill her; 
It was probably the one time in my life that I could have committed double hom-
icide and not had any remorse; 
I wanted her and him dead. I just wanted both of them removed from life; 
I was so angry that had they both or either one of them been around, I may well 
have ended up in prison for murder; 
I wanted her dead. Extreme anger and rage. I wanted to strangle the life out of 
her. She was a heartless bitch; and 
I felt like beating her to death. I wanted her to die, and I wanted the last thought 
to go through her head to be that she brought this on herself. If I could have 
done it without getting caught, I believe I would have killed her and not felt any 
remorse. 
                                                        
88  Kyron Huigens, A Critical Introduction to the Symposium, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 7 
(2009) (paraphrasing John Gardner’s argument and citing generally JOHN GARDNER, 
OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2007)). 
89  See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
90  See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text; see generally Max M. Krasnow et al., 
What Are Punishment and Reputation for?, 7 PLOS ONE 1 (2012). 
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These statements raise another important normative limitation of our find-
ings: they do nothing to allay the concerns that the heat of passion defense is 
often used to mitigate the punishment for male violence against women. A 
prominent criticism of the doctrine is that it is an “abuse excuse” and that it has 
been disproportionately beneficial to cuckolded males while leaving other cate-
gories of defendants—such as females who kill their husbands after years of 
physical abuse, but do so not while “in the heat of passion”—without a similar 
safety net.91 These criticisms are unaffected by the results reported here. Again, 
what our findings support is the idea that the general psychological premises on 
which these normative conclusions are based are, to a degree, accurate. They 
do not support (nor do they contradict) the underlying normative claim that any 
particular class of defendants is any less deserving of punishment than others. 
 Finally, our findings should caution against some of the more liberal stand-
ards being deployed in the wake of the MPC’s expanded definition.92 Emotions 
are not a unitary phenomenon. Just as anger predictably influenced motivation 
in ways that were consistent with its psychological function, we should expect 
other emotions to have their own set of effects unique to their individual func-
tions. Anger has a much different function than fear, which has a much differ-
ent function than disgust, and so on. There is no a priori reason, based on our 
findings here, to assume that because anger coincides with motivation beyond 
what the actor feels is justified, that in turn any “extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance” could produce this same effect. In fact, existing theory and re-
search would suggest an alternative hypothesis—that only those emotions 
whose design features typically include “approach” motivations might repro-
duce the effect seen with anger.93 More research would be necessary to substan-
tiate this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
These findings are the first in any discipline to empirically demonstrate 
what, for centuries, the criminal law has simply assumed. Do these results con-
                                                        
91  See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide 
Law Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 33, 33 (2010) (discussing the concept of prov-
ocation as an “ ‘abuse excuse’ ”); The critique is so prominent that it appears alongside the 
doctrine itself in leading criminal law casebooks. Gruber, supra note 19, at 273 (noting the 
prevalence of the critique). For in-depth examples of this critique, see generally Clavel, su-
pra note 27; Coker, supra note 15; Miller, supra note 18; and Rozelle, supra note 18. 
92  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118 (2017) (“Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter 
in the first degree when: . . . (b) It is committed intentionally by a defendant under the influ-
ence of extreme emotional disturbance as provided in ORS 163.135, which constitutes a mit-
igating circumstance reducing the homicide that would otherwise be murder to manslaughter 
in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution;”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
205.5 (1)(b) (2009) (“Special mitigation exists when the actor causes the death of another or 
attempts to cause the death of another: . . . (b) under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
tress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.”). 
93  See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
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firm that the heat of passion doctrine has had it right all along? No, and in fact 
they suggest that, to some degree, there are flaws in the normative reasoning 
that has traditionally been applied. But they do allow courts and legal scholars 
to engage in future normative analysis with a clearer and more confident under-
standing of the psychological processes on which those normative analyses de-
pend. 
 These results should not be seen as the definitive empirical treatment of ei-
ther the provocation doctrine or the psychological phenomena on which the 
doctrine relies. Rather, this study should serve as a first step—as proof of con-
cept for a general framework that triangulates the relationships among emo-
































18 NEV. L.J. 33, PATRICK LIEBERMAN - FINAL.DOCX 1/2/18  10:44 AM 










[PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
 
 
 
 
